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Background: Although bodies of evidence on copayment effects on access to care and quality of care in general
have not been conclusive, allowing copayment in the case of emergency medical conditions might pose a high
risk of delayed treatment leading to avoidable disability or death.
Methods: Using mixed-methods approach to draw evidence from multiple sources (over 40,000 records of
administrative dataset of Thai emergency medical services, in-depth interviews, telephone survey of users and
documentary review), we are were able to shed light on the existence of copayment and its related factors in the
Thai healthcare system despite the presence of universal health coverage since 2001.
Results: The copayment poses a barrier of access to emergency care delivered by private hospitals despite the
policy proclaiming free access and payment. The copayment differentially affects beneficiaries of the major 3
public-health insurance schemes hence inducing inequity of access.
Conclusions: We have identified 6 drivers of the copayment i.e., 1) perceived under payment, 2) unclear
operational definitions of emergency conditions or 3) lack of criteria to justify inter-hospital transfer after the first
72 h of admission, 4) limited understanding by the service users of the policy-directed benefits, 5) weak regulatory
mechanism as indicated by lack of information systems to trace private provider’s practices, and 6) ineffective
arrangements for inter-hospital transfer. With demand-side perspectives, we addressed the reasons for bypassing
gatekeepers or assigned local hospitals. These are the perception of inferior quality of care and age-related
tendency to use emergency department, which indicate a deficit in the current healthcare systems under universal
health coverage. Finally, we have discussed strategies to address these potential drivers of copayment and needs
for further studies.
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Many health authorities advocate for universal health
coverage (UHC) regardless of economic status of a
country citing potential benefits such as financial pro-
tection from catastrophic illnesses, increased access to
healthcare, and reduction in out-of-pocket payments
(OOP) [1, 2]. For decades, implementation of the
UHC concept has not only been possible even in low
income countries, but has also led to the expected
benefits [3, 4]. To achieve UHC, at least three major
functions need to pursue: raising revenues, pooling
risk and purchasing health services [5]. Copayment is
considered a means to reduce demand-side practices
of over utilization of healthcare due to moral hazard
or a form of revenue generation [6]. Regardless of its
expected functions, copayment has been associated
with dampening effect on demand for necessary services
and can even lead to catastrophic spending [2, 7].
In 2001, a new major public-health financing program
(the Universal Health Coverage Scheme, UCS) was in-
troduced in Thailand providing coverage of healthcare
extending to 75 % of the population. This major step ad-
vanced the national health insurance reforms towards
full universal coverage on top of the previous public-
health insurance schemes (Social Security Scheme, SSS
and Civil Servant Benefit Scheme, CSMBS). Over a dec-
ade of the full universal coverage in Thailand, evidence
has shown increased financial risk protection and in-
creased service utilization [8]. Together it seems like
copayment is not an issue of concern under the full uni-
versal coverage [9]. However, a national household sur-
vey in 2013 revealed that 39.2 % of UCS beneficiaries
made use of outpatient care in public and private health
facilities with OOP [10]. The figure for inpatient care
with OOP was 8.5 %. It has been argued that the main
reasons for the remaining OOP are beneficiaries bypass-
ing the referral system or making use of private hospital
inpatient care [11]. The prevalence of OOP charges may
be caused by a range of factors including: absence of full
population coverage; key services not being included in
the benefit package; beneficiaries bypassing the assigned
local providers or bypassing the referral system in acces-
sing inpatient care; or inappropriate or illegal billing
practices by regular providers [12].
In addition, users’ perception of quality of care can in-
fluence choices of providers hence resulting in OOP
when bypassing the assigned local providers for provider
of choice. Using multiple logistic regression model to
analyse in-patient survey data, Cheng et al. revealed a
strong association between perceived quality of care
(technical capabilities or interpersonal skills) and choices
of providers [13].
In April 2012, the Thai government undertook a
nation-wide unified Emergency Medical Services (EMS)policy initiative in mobilizing private hospitals in
addition to those participating in 2 major public health
financing programs (SSS and UCS) to fill the perceived
gap of access to EMS for all health insurance beneficiar-
ies. The perceived gap of access was highlighted by the
Prime Minister out of a concern of inequitable access
due to different amount and mechanisms of payment
among the three major schemes [14]. In other words,
these private providers could be considered outside
contracted private hospitals. As a result, the government
established a specific purchasing model to compensate
these private hospitals for provision of emergency de-
partment (ED) services and inpatient services. Given the
compensation, policymakers expect that the service
provision should be free from copayment. Apart from
filling the gap, this policy also involved an implicit ob-
jective i.e., to make an attempt to unify purchasing
models across the 3 schemes using the purchase of EMS
as an entry point.
To guide the policy implementation, a two-phase inde-
pendent evaluation was undertaken employing a mixed
methods approach (to be presented in detail below) to
shed light on the progression, obstacles and alternatives
for policy adjustment. The first phase covered the first
six months of the policy implementation from which
findings and respective feedback to policymakers and
stakeholders guided the second phase. An important
finding from the first phase deals with patient outcomes.
Using an administrative dataset of 22,900 records for the
unified purchasing model, Paibul et al. reported a dis-
crepancy in fatal and non-fatal outcomes at discharge
from inpatient care among the beneficiaries of different
schemes [15]. In comparison to the outcomes of CSMBS
beneficiaries, UCS and SSS beneficiaries are 1.7 to 2.1
times more likely to be reported not-improved status or
1.2 to 1.9 times more likely to be reported dead upon
discharge from inpatient care. The discrepancy was inde-
pendent of age, sex, severity of medical conditions and
length of stay according to multiple logistic regression
analysis. The report indicated a possibility of the effect
of differential affordability for copayment among differ-
ent beneficiary groups contributing to disparity of the
outcomes.
The copayment seems likely given the fact that there
is no legal provision to support the policy expectation of
no extra payment. In addition, the haste in policy imple-
mentation (less than 2 weeks in preparation phase) may
preclude consultation with private providers about pay-
ment rates. Comparing the single payment rate for in-
patient care to private providers of 10,500 baht per
relative weight (RW) of diagnosis-related-group (DRG)
under this policy to that of 15,000 baht per RW under
an earlier program of the UCS, it could readily be argued
that perceived under payment among the private
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mentation, we sought to document the prevalence of
copayment under the new policy and to identify the
main drivers of copayments and to evaluate the implica-
tions of copayments for access.
These are the key policy questions to be explored in
this report. Answering these questions may be useful in
the further development of laws, processes and institu-
tional responsibilities that define private sector participa-
tion in the provision of essential health services under
UHC. Notwithstanding careful searching of the main
bibliographic databases covering health services no re-
ports on the effects of copayment on utilization of EMS
and factors related to the copayment in low and middle-
income countries were identified.
Settings
Over the last 3 decades, EMS systems in Thailand have
gradually evolved in response to the emergency health
needs. The EMS systems include pre-hospital ambulance
services, medical emergency dispatch centers, ED ser-
vices and inpatient definitive care organized mainly by
public providers in rural and urban settings and to a cer-
tain extent by private providers in major cities.
Since 2001, UCS, SSS and CSMBS have mainly fi-
nanced hospital emergency services including ED and
inpatient definitive care. The payment methods and pay-
ment rates differ among the 3 schemes with some over-
lapping as follows.
Under the UCS, all the contracted hospitals, both pub-
lic and private, are paid for EMS provided to a non-
registered UCS member by fee for service (FFS) with a
ceiling of 700 Baht for ED visits and DRG with global
budget for inpatient care. FFS with ceiling was adopted
to pay private hospitals outside the contract for both ED
and inpatient care. Under the SSS, public hospitals are
paid according to the billing for ED visits and the first
72 h of admission. For private non-registered hospitals,
both under and outside the contract, the patients have
to pay upfront and reimburse from the central fund by
FFS with ceiling for both ED visits and the first 72 h of
admission. After 72 h of admission, the registered hos-
pital is fully responsible for the costs of service provided.
Under CSMBS payment methods, all public hospitals
are reimbursed on a fee schedule for ED visits and on
the DRG basis for inpatient care plus boarding and med-
ical supply based on a predefined list. Prior to the policy
initiative, the reimbursement for inpatient care to private
hospitals was capped at 4,000 Baht (133 United States
Dollar (USD)) per admission. There was no payment for
ED service to private hospitals. Notably, a CSMBS bene-
ficiary is not required to register to any hospitals, as op-
posed to those of SSS and UCS. Should there be a need
for inter-hospital transfer after initial admission to ahospital for an emergency condition they are more likely
to face difficulty in seeking another hospital for the
transfer.
Without an exclusive dataset for ED services, an un-
official estimate of total ED visits to public hospital was
reported to be 13 million annually [15]. Based on this
figure and a reported figure of 32 % admission rate from
ED [16], the annual workload of inpatient emergency
cases for the whole country could be at least 416,000 per
year. Despite the fact that private providers play a sig-
nificant role in provision of emergency services in the
country, there is no data on the service provision and
expenditure [17].
Policy interventions
The unified EMS policy aims to close the gap of access
to EMS under the three health insurance schemes. The
policy interventions include mobilizing private hospitals
outside the previous contracts; unification of payment
methods and payment rates for purchase of EMS from
these private hospitals; public policy communication to
inform the beneficiaries on the right of access without
copayment; and monitoring of the progress for ongoing
adjustment. The National Health Security Office
(NHSO), in charge of UCS, is assigned to be the respon-
sible agency in executing this policy. The unified pur-
chasing model is characterized as single payment
methods and single payment rates for ED visits and
hospitalization to the outside contracted private hospi-
tals. For ED visits, the payment is based on the fee
schedule of the existing CSMBS protocol plus extra
items beyond the fee schedule, but does not exceed
1,000 Baht. For hospitalization, DRG is a case-based pay-
ment at 10,500 Baht (approximately 350 USD) per ad-
justed RW which is used to reimburse the private
hospitals. The private hospitals receive extra payments
for high cost medications and medical instruments (e.g.,
prosthesis, intravascular stents). Financial audit of every
claim is mandatory prior to the reimbursement. This in-
cludes checking severity classification, DRG related data,
health insurance entitlement, patient identification (ID)
code, hospital ID code, and date/time of hospital visit
and discharge. NHSO also acts as the Clearing House to
process reimbursement claim, patient complaints, and to
coordinate, in collaboration with Ministry of Public
Health (MOPH), inter-hospital transfer of patients. An
administrative dataset was exclusively set up to facilitate
the financial claim processes using online transactions.
As part of the policy implementation, the government
made use of mass media and out-door media for public
communication campaign to raise awareness of free ac-
cess to all public and private hospitals nation-wide in
case of a need for EMS despite the fact that supply-side
interventions are limited to 255 outside contracted
Table 1 Summary of participants in in-depth interviews
Position Region
Southern Northeastern Northern Bangkok
Hospital directors 2 2 5 3
Financial staff 2 2 5 3
Nurses 5 2 8 6




N.A. N.A. N.A. 6
N.A. not applicable
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hospitals). In addition to the unified payment mechan-
ism, the MOPH held several official meetings with rep-
resentatives of the private hospitals to press them to
participate citing the mandate stipulated in The Sanator-
ium Act B.E. 2541. The law requires private hospitals to
provide emergency care for any patients until the emer-
gency condition has been stabilized without mentioning
any hospital payments and definitions of the conditions.
The combined supply-side and demand-side interven-
tions of the programs mentioned are expected to work
together in promoting better access to emergency ser-
vices. It is noteworthy that the majority of the outside
contracted private hospitals previously chose to focus on
the high-end well-paid market of healthcare. Setting the
payment rate without adequate participation of these
private hospitals hence posted a challenge in their com-
pliance to the service provision. The lack of any regula-
tory capacity to compel the private hospitals not to
charge copayments above the EMS payments posted an-
other challenge of copayment.
In practice, the program involved a large body of rep-
resentatives mainly from the outside contracted private
hospitals, 3 departmental units of the MOPH, and the 3
schemes. In every high-level decision-making forum, the
Prime Minister chaired the meetings herself indicating a
strong policy commitment. Monthly reports of the pro-
gress in policy implementation in terms of outputs and
public responses (directly from the complaint channel
and indirectly from mass media) were key inputs to the
forums. Multiple stakeholders with multiple perspectives
were brought into the policy arena along with the ambi-
tious purpose of achieving more unified healthcare fi-
nancing mechanism (after a decade of stagnation on this
policy track) [8] and access to EMS expanded at the
same time to support this policy initiative.
Methods
This study was approved by the Institutional Ethical
Review Board of the Faculty of Medicine, Ramathibodi
Hospital.
Given the complicated financial arrangements and
complexity of the policy implementation, we chose to
use a mix-methods approach to fill the knowledge gaps.
In principle, a mixed methods has been considered suit-
able for research questions fitting any of the following
characteristics: exploring the meaning of a construct or
phenomenon from more than one perspective; explan-
ation of anomalous findings or getting behind the mech-
anism of action of an effect; theory development
followed by testing/extension; measure development
using grounded concepts; or augmenting evaluation
studies with better understanding of intervention imple-
mentation [18–20].In our case, the posted research questions seem to be,
largely, in keeping with these characteristics. First, the
complexity of the policy initiative precludes any single
perspective to dominate making sense of the meanings
of the policy phenomenon. Second, to understand the
constraints and drivers regarding access to EMS and the
underlying functions and mechanisms requires qualita-
tive findings from in-depth interviews with multiple
stakeholders and quantitative findings from the user
complaint channel or more systematic user survey. The
following describes details of the methods in the data
acquisition.
It is notable that the two-phase evaluation was carried
out with substantial participation from key actors from
the inception (the evaluation planning) to drafting of the
final reports. The key actors comprised the 3 schemes,
MOPH as regulator, the Clearing House, and the Private
Hospital Association. This participatory approach en-
abled the authors to get access to relevant policy docu-
ments and the administrative (electronic claim) dataset.
Nonetheless, despite the involvement of the Private
Hospital Association, the authors did not have access to
any financial data from the targeted private hospitals. In
addition, we could not access to the minutes of all the
meetings chaired by the Prime Minister.Sources of information and data
Primary data
In-depth interview
In order to explore potential explanatory factors of
copayment, we employed in-depth interviews with key
actors: regulators, private hospital directors, the Clearing
House administrators and the administrators of the
health insurance schemes (Table 1). Emerging themes
identified from the in-depth interviews covered: oper-
ational definition of emergency conditions, mechanisms
to ensure common understanding and acceptance of the
definition among the key stakeholders, regulatory func-
tion and mechanism to enhance provider compliance to
the laws and the policy intentions, provision of care
Suriyawongpaisal et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2016) 16:606 Page 5 of 18within each hospital, and feedback on the payment and
the regulation (Additional file 1).
Selected private hospitals were purposively chosen
aiming at hospitals with billing at the 3rd quartile (6,525
USD) or over and those under the 2nd quartile (3,597
USD) or below. This selection criterion enabled us to
contrast factors, which might explain relevant hospital
behaviors (service provision, pricing policies, and opin-
ions about the policy initiative). Distribution of selected
private hospitals and their locations is shown in Table 2.
In each hospital, participants included a hospital dir-
ector, ED staff (doctors and nurses), and a financial
officer.
User survey
To ascertain the prevalence of copayment, independent
of those from the official complaint dataset, a telephone
survey was (Additional file 2) conducted on 128 ran-
domly chosen patients from the total number of 1,745
patients in April 2012, which was the first month of the
policy implementation. The survey explored the following
issues: perception of the policy messages, access to care
(mode of access, choices of hospitals, and reasons for the
choice), opinions about the services and copayment.
Secondary data
Emergency medical claim online (EMCO) data set
The EMCO dataset included 43,588 records of financial
claims from 225 private hospitals or 88.2 % of the ex-
pected number (providing secondary and/or tertiary
medical care with a total capacity of inpatient care of
29,734 beds or 20.6 % of the whole country figure) dur-
ing April 2012 to December 2013. Ninety one percent of
the records dealt with inpatient care. The EMCO dataset
contains 50 variables including those extracted for the
present study: amount of claims, amount of reimburse-
ment, claim approval status, adjusted relative weight
AdjRW), and service delivery data (severity classification,
principal diagnosis, type of hospital visit (ED or inpatient
department), date/time at discharge, and outcomes at
discharge.
Documentary review
We reviewed documents to supplement and triangulate
findings from the user survey and in-depth interviews.Table 2 Number of selected private hospitals by hospital
location and amount of billing
Amount of billing Hospital location
Northern Southern Northeastern Bangkok
3rd quartile and above 2 1 1 2
2nd quartile and below 3 2 1 1We searched documents purposively using Google
Scholar and Google Search and PubMed based on the
following keywords: EMS, regulation, definition, private
hospital, payment methods, access, ED, outpatient, in-
patient, annual report of regulatory agencies. We con-
tact key actors mentioned above for relevant
documents not accessible via internet. From the Clear-
ing House, we try to identify 3 major types of docu-
ments i.e., a report of user complaints, a summary
report on progress of the program and telephone sur-
vey reports. Finally, we employ snowball search strategy
to obtain further documents to better understand




We performed statistical analyses using IBM SPSS
Statistics version 18.0 (IBM Co., Armonk, NY, USA).
Profile of patients in the 3 groups of health insurance
schemes and monthly access to inpatient care were com-
pared using percentage for categorical data and mean
for continuous data (Table 3). We have presented
monthly case mix index (CMI) and fatalities by severity
over 21 months in percentages (Table 4). CMI, calcu-
lated by dividing sum of relative weights by number of
patients for each month. Given heterogeneous size of
the hospitals and expected differences for charging
among them, it is interesting to know how financial
claims from the hospitals with different size might vary
over time and how hospital charges might vary among
hospital of various sizes. Data are presented accordingly
in Figs. 1 and 2. Then we show a plot of average amount
with 95 % confidence interval (CI) of monthly claims
from these hospitals over the 21 months in Fig. 3. Across
the 21-month period, average paid-charge ratios with
95 % CI are presented when the figures are greater than
zero (Fig. 4). This cut-off value was chosen due to sub-
stantial number of records with no payment. To explore
the trends of claim processing status (pending or
rejected) by month of the policy implementation,
monthly approved claims were subtracted from monthly
total claims then percent of claim processing status for
each month was estimated as shown in Table 5. Factors
related to hospital charge were investigated using mul-
tiple linear regression analysis (Table 6). Finally, we ex-
tracted findings from the Clearing House reports on a
series of telephone surveys on the demand side and
summarize in Table 7.
Qualitative data
Digital electronic records of the in-depth interviews
conducted during the first three months of the program
were transcribed verbatim. The key interview questions
Table 3 Profile of patients with health insurance status, severity and monthly access to inpatient care (row%)
CSMBS (N = 25,834) SSS (N = 2,621) UCS (N = 14,757) Overall (N = 43,212)
Mean age (95 % CI) 65.2 (64.9,65.5) 40.7 (40.2,41.2) 47.3 (46.9,47.8)
% male 45.3 50.2 56.1
Percentage of access 59.8 % 6.1 % 34.1 % 100 %
Percentage of beneficiary in 2013a 8.6 % 15.4 % 74.4 % 100 %
Severity
Critical 36.20 % 42.70 % 51.70 % 41.90 %
Urgent 57.10 % 50.20 % 45.60 % 52.70 %
Non urgent 4.10 % 4.60 % 1.50 % 3.30 %
Non-EMS 2.60 % 2.50 % 1.20 % 2.10 %
Month of policy implementation
1 28.9 % 11.0 % 60.1 % 1,232
2 42.6 % 9.4 % 48.0 % 1,400
3 50.7 % 6.1 % 43.2 % 1,908
4 56.1 % 6.2 % 37.7 % 2,149
5 56.4 % 5.1 % 38.5 % 2,442
6 61.5 % 4.8 % 33.6 % 2,696
7 58.9 % 6.2 % 34.9 % 2,276
8 59.3 % 5.8 % 34.9 % 2,597
9 64.4 % 5.2 % 30.4 % 2,750
10 61.9 % 5.4 % 32.8 % 2,372
11 62.5 % 6.0 % 31.5 % 2,414
12 64.4 % 5.7 % 29.9 % 2,194
13 63.0 % 6.3 % 30.8 % 2,252
14 62.5 % 6.0 % 31.4 % 2,192
15 65.0 % 5.3 % 29.7 % 2,253
16 65.4 % 6.2 % 28.4 % 1,953
17 66.4 % 5.5 % 28.1 % 1,836
18 64.1 % 4.7 % 31.2 % 1,820
19 63.9 % 6.7 % 29.4 % 1,470
20 60.5 % 6.3 % 33.2 % 1,346
21 55.4 % 7.2 % 37.4 % 1,232
aNational Statistical Office. Executive Summary. Health and welfare survey B.E. 2556 (2013) http://service.nso.go.th/nso/nsopublish/themes/files/healthy/
healthyExec56.pdf [in Thai]
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mechanism and process of policy implementation,
regulatory function and mechanism, provision of care
and claim process, and feedback on payment system.
We performed thematic content analysis to capture
emerging themes. Subthemes and details are organized
under the emerging themes. Relationships between
themes and subthemes are identified. These were car-
ried out in parallel by the first three authors. The au-
thors discussed the findings to achieve consensus on
the conclusions. Similarly, we applied the processes to
documentary reviews. Table 8 summarizes key findings
from the in-depth interviews.Results
Volume of services, case-mix and severity of the patients
Analysis of the EMCO dataset reveals 43,588 patient
claim visits to 225 private hospitals (88.2 % of the total
eligible 255 private hospitals) during the first 21 months
of the program (April 2012 - December 2013). The ma-
jority of claims (91 %) were for inpatient care. Table 3
shows CSMBS beneficiaries constituted the majority of
total inpatients (59.8 %) then UCS beneficiaries came
second (34.1 %) and SSS beneficiaries were the smallest
proportion (6.1 %). This is discordant to the percentage
of total number of beneficiaries for each group. The
number of inpatient claims for each month varied from












1 1.59 15.1 % 0.7 % 0.0 % 1,640
2 1.93 16.3 % 1.4 % 0.0 % 1,230
3 1.91 18.2 % 1.5 % 8.3 % 1,394
4 1.87 16.9 % 1.7 % 0.0 % 1,904
5 1.77 17.1 % 1.6 % 0.0 % 2,144
6 1.63 15.8 % 1.2 % 6.7 % 2,439
7 1.69 14.1 % 1.3 % 0.0 % 2,689
8 1.54 15.9 % 1.5 % 0.0 % 2,275
9 1.54 13.9 % 1.0 % 0.0 % 2,588
10 1.59 15.7 % 1.4 % 1.8 % 2,735
11 1.44 11.1 % 1.4 % 0.0 % 2,344
12 1.55 13.4 % 2.2 % 0.5 % 2,332
13 1.57 17.7 % 2.0 % 0.5 % 2,051
14 1.47 13.1 % 2.4 % 0.5 % 2,149
15 1.48 13.1 % 2.0 % 0.0 % 2,109
16 1.49 15.3 % 1.2 % 1.3 % 2,142
17 1.49 5.9 % 0.9 % 9.1 % 1,877
18 1.48 6.9 % 2.9 % 6.7 % 1,771
19 1.52 5.8 % 4.2 % 9.1 % 1,755
20 1.34 6.2 % 1.7 % 0.0 % 1,414
21 1.03 6.8 % 2.7 % 0.0 % 1,310
overall 11.7 % 1.6 % 0.9 % 42,292
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at the 9th month. While percentage of access of CSMBS
beneficiaries started at the lowest in 1st month then in-
creased 1.8 times later on, those of UCS and SSS benefi-
ciaries showed the opposite trends. Regarding severity
among the three groups, CSMBS beneficiaries were hos-
pitalized with the lowest percent (36 %) of critical condi-
tions as compared to those of the others (Table 3).
The majority of patients reportedly visited with urgent
conditions (22,569 cases or 53 %) shown in Table 4.
Overall, those with critical conditions encountered a fa-
tality of 11.7 % which is 10 times more than those with
other conditions. However, the trends of fatality for each
severity group were not stable. The last five months ob-
served a sharp drop in fatality of those with critical con-
ditions, roughly a third of those in earlier months. This
happened in parallel with a sharp increase in the figures
for those with urgent or non-urgent conditions. These
findings indicated misclassification in severity of the
claim records. Nonetheless, CMI seemed to follow a
steadier declining trend. The percentage of cases for
each 10th International Statistical Classification of Dis-
eases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10) categorywith top three highest figures respectively was 21 % for
the respiratory system, 15.2 % for digestive system, and
14.6 % for certain infectious and parasitic diseases.
Hospital charge and reimbursement
Hospitals participating in the program varied in size
from 10 to 500 beds with a median of 150 beds (top
quartile 230 beds and bottom quartile 100 beds). Over
the period, claims from small hospitals (under 200 beds,
Fig. 1) dominated the whole picture. While the number
of claims from big hospitals (over 300 beds) dropped
continually after the 4th month, those from other hospi-
tals seemed to follow an inverted U shape with 2 con-
secutive sharp drops at 10th month and the 16th month
respectively. Hospital charge per case varied from 1,000
to 5.5 million baht (33.3 to 183,333.3 USD using an ex-
change rate of 1 USD for 30 baht) with a median of
28,018 Baht (934 USD). Average charge positively corre-
lated with hospital size (upper panel, Fig. 2) which was
similar to the correlation between adjRW and hospital
size (lower panel, Fig. 2). In terms of payment, hospitals
were reimbursed at a minimum of 0.0002 to a maximum
of 9.9 times the total amount of charge with a median of
33.5 % of the total amount. At the top quartile, hospitals
were reimbursed at 56 % of the total amount and 19.8 %
at the bottom quartile. Faced with a perceived under
payment, hospitals might react by upward adjustment of
the charge.
On one hand, average monthly hospital charge
showed a fluctuating trend over the 21 months (Fig. 3),
whereas monthly CMI seemed to follow a slight down-
ward trend (Table 4). On the other hand, paid-charge
ratio followed a sharp downward trend during the
same period, (Fig. 3) together with a drastic drop of
the approved claim rate from 82.5 to 29.6 % during
the period (overall claim approval was 59.3 %)
(Table 5). These seemingly contradictory pieces of evi-
dence from each side might indicate upward adjust-
ment of hospital charge per case or per service item
given fixed reimbursement rates. It might also indicate
changing mix of hospital size with a tendency of big
hospitals (over 300 beds) withdrawing from the pro-
gram quite early (Fig. 1). These observations are in ac-
cordance with further analysis as follows. Over the
21 months, percentage of monthly claims being
rejected or pending was steadily increasing from the
first month onward (Table 5). Using multiple linear re-
gression analysis (Table 6), it was found that the total
amount of hospital charge was significantly associated
with the following factors (in order of magnitude ac-
cording to standardized beta coefficient): adjRW, paid
charge ratio (ratio between total amount of reimburse-
ment and total amount of hospital charge), age, hos-
pital size, hospital location, month of hospital visits,
Fig. 1 Trends of hospital claims by size over the study period
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ity. This means the amount of hospital charge in-
creased according to the value of adjRW. Big hospitals
charge higher price than small hospitals (Fig. 2). Hos-
pitals in Bangkok charge more than hospitals outside
Bangkok although consumer price index for Bangkok
was not the highest in the country during 2012 and
2013 [21]. The amount of charge followed an increas-
ing trend from the beginning to the end of the 21-
month period. It increased against paid-charge ratio
and increased with age of the patient. The amount de-
creased when tracking from that for CSMBS benefi-
ciaries to those for SSS and UCS respectively.
Up to this point, the interactions between the hospi-
tals and the Clearing House might be better understood
taking the viewpoint of complex adaptive systems
(CAS) [22]. According to this viewpoint, healthcare sys-
tem is considered a system which consists of elements
interacting in freedom and with the ability to respond
to stimuli in many different and fundamentally unpre-
dictable ways. Adopting the CAS perspective, it follows
that the hospitals play out the game by increasing
charges or withdrawing (Fig. 1) based on perceived
under payment and the payers (through the Clearing
House) counteract by claim rejection or adherence to
the payment rates. Additionally, the hospitals could
also employ copayment as a strategy to cope with per-
ceived under payment given the absence of laws or reg-
ulations precluding copayment. The next section is
going to deal with this notion.Copayment and related factors
With the perceived under payment, hospitals might opt
for copayment in addition to the upward adjustment of
charges or withdrawal. Based on the paid-charge ratios,
it could be inferred that the hospitals might request for
a substantial copayment from roughly 40 to 80 % of the
total charge. This notion is supported by evidence from
the consumer surveys. As part of the feedback to the
policy implementation, the Clearing House ran a series
of telephone surveys in 3 consecutive periods (1st–3rd
months, 7th–9th months and 12th–15th month), which
showed the prevalence of copayment varied from 53 to
95 % as shown in Table 7. Results from our telephone
survey (N = 128) for the first month of the program
found the prevalence (%) of copayment varied from 80 %
for CSMBS beneficiaries to 50 % for UCS and 30 % for
SSS beneficiaries. The prevalence of copayment require-
ments reflects the fact that private hospitals perceived
the reimbursement rate set by the Clearing House as
under compensation to the cost of services.
The discrepancy in the amount reimbursed and the
total charge clearly demonstrates a conflict between pri-
cing policy of the hospitals and the adopted payment
policy. To support the pricing policy, the hospitals ar-
gued that they set prices to reflect full cost recovery and
a surplus of under 15 % per annum (Table 8). Based on
this argument, we explored our previous report on pri-
cing of the hospitals using EMCO dataset for the first
3 month period focusing on patients in critical or urgent
conditions (N = 1,257 records). We found different
Fig. 2 Comparison of hospital charge (upper panel) and adjusted RW (lower panel) by size
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hospitals: security-market registered hospitals, general
private hospitals, and not-for-profit private hospitals. On
average security-market registered hospitals are bigger
than the others (174 vs 81 beds per hospitals). The me-
dian price varied as follows: 47,246 Baht, 38,565 Baht
and 35,727 Baht, respectively (p-value = 0.0001). Further
analysis taking account expected differences in fixed and
operating cost between hospitals in Bangkok and
regional provinces, we found no difference in price
among security-market registered hospitals operating inBangkok or regional provinces. To the contrary, the
differences were demonstrated for the other two cat-
egories i.e., higher price for hospitals operating in
Bangkok and lower price for hospitals in regional prov-
inces. These findings vividly indicate different pricing
policies among different categories of the hospitals. It
should be noted that security-market registered hospi-
tals charged the highest price despite the fact that they
are in a better position to access loans at the lowest
interest rates compared to the others. Finally, in the
same report, our team conducted a head-to-head
Fig. 3 Trends of hospital charge (95 % CI of the means) over the study period
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ical supply) on 80 selected patients of the private hospi-
tals to those prices of a tertiary care public hospital to
shed light on rational of the pricing. We found that
medication prices differed from 1.15 to 399 times and
1.55 to 4.4 times for medical supply. By reviewing med-
ical records and hospital bills, we also found seemingly
unnecessary charge items on the hospital bills. For in-
stance, the items included a screening test for prostate
cancer in a patient with pneumonia, bone fixation in a
patient with hypertension, and blood transfusion with-
out proper medical indications. Results of the head-to-
head comparison and the review of medical records
cum hospital bills suggested inappropriate pricing of
some private hospitals. After viewing these findings, re-
action from representatives of the hospitals turned out
quite predictable. They argued that private hospitals
have to fully rely on themselves from the first to the
last dollar in capital investment and daily operation,
which is not the case for public hospitals. As a result,
they argued comparisons are not appropriate. Withregard to the findings from the review of medical re-
cords and hospital bills, they did not give any opinion.
In-depth interview provided further evidence related
to the copayment level. Private hospitals cited unclear
operational definitions of emergency conditions as a
reason to impose copayment to deter perceived abuse
of the services by patients. This perception emerges
from the hospitals report of encountering patients with
non-urgent conditions requesting free access to ED and
inpatient care. This notion sounds logical given the
large proportion (90 %) of patients accessing ED by in-
formal means [15]. This renders the prehospital care
triage systems (with standard criteria of severity classi-
fication) irrelevant. Next, the hospitals also reported
patients bypassing closest public hospitals to their facil-
ities. This finding corresponded to the finding from our
telephone surveys (N = 128) revealing the most com-
mon reasons for bypassing closest public or private
hospitals were due to a perception of inferior quality of
care. Finally, the private hospitals vindicate copayment
by attributing to the lack of criteria to justify inter-
Fig. 4 Trend of paid-charge ratio (95 % CI of the means) over 21 months (excluding the ratio = 0)
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the patients demand further stay.
Patient’s voices and policy communication
Our telephone survey on the 128 patient samples re-
vealed over 90 % of them were ignorant of the channel
for making complaint to the Clearing House. During the
early months of the program, analysis of complaint calls
from the patients or relatives to the Clearing House
identified 1,165 calls asking for clarification of eligible
emergency conditions; 633 calls of eligible hospitals for
access; and 409 calls of the conditions for copayment.
These findings indicate inadequate public policy com-
munication to the users.
Public governance of the hospitals and the public
financial arrangement
The high degree of freedom in price setting by the hos-
pitals raises an issue of hospital regulatory mechanism.
The Sanatorium Act B.E. 2541 (section 32) requires hos-
pitals to disclose prices of medical and hospital serviceswhich hospitals have to comply with accordingly. To en-
force the laws, the Health Facility Committee has been
set up and chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the
MOPH. Its voting members consist of the Heads of 4
departments of the MOPH, a representative of the
Council of State and of the Office of Consumer Protec-
tion. In addition, the committee includes 3 health practi-
tioners, a representative of each of the health
professional councils and technical advisors which have
to be representatives from the private hospitals for at
least 1 person and no more than 3. The Committee has
been tasked with issuing regulations, granting permis-
sion for establishing and operating a hospital, promoting
quality improvement and processing appeals. Since the
law has been in place for almost two decades, there have
not been any information systems to keep track of the
hospital behaviors. Alarmingly, informal interview found
a key informant, (a senior health officer with direct ex-
perience in working on the committee) who maintained
that he had never witnessed a single case of hospitals be-
ing seriously dealt with for misconduct. This notion is in
Table 5 Percent distribution of claims being rejected or
pending by month of policy implementation
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ports in 2006–2014 of the department overseeing the
Sanatorium Act, which found no evidence pertinent to
the law enforcement [23].
Turning to the payment rate issue, in-depth interview
with high-ranking officers of the Clearing House and the
health insurance schemes revealed the rationale behind






Adjusted RW 34692.841 267.856
Paid charge ratio −97518.033 1901.460
Severity 803.070 519.021
Hospital size 8239.254 733.076
Hospital location 1165.675 120.335
Sex −1831.117 1478.853
Health insurance status −3013.317 814.306being set without concrete evidence about the cost of
hospital services except for a concern of future financial
burden to the UCS if a higher rate than the current one
would have been adopted. However, in effect, a higher
rate of DRG-based payment to private hospitals has been
adopted for other previous programs under the UCS for
medical services for premature newborns, patients with
severe head injury, cardiac catherization etcetera.
Finally, in-depth interview of the administrators of the
3 schemes revealed no concrete evidence of any progress
in the attempts to make changes in rules and regulations
pertinent to the program requirement i.e. harmonizing
the payment mechanism and payment rates to facilitate
access to EMS of the hospitals. Hence, the existing pay-
ment made possible using the financial resources and
personnel of the UCS assigned to take major responsibil-
ity in the program execution through the Clearing
House. Major obstacles cited by the administrators of
SSS and CSMBS are the concern of potential impacts of
the expected amendment of rules and regulations on all
other benefit packages for non-emergency conditions.
Discussion
Copayment and its effects
Using a mixed methods, this report is able to shed light
on the existence of copayment despite the public finan-
cing of access to the hospital provision of EMS during
the 21 months of the program implementation. The
copayment existed in parallel with inequitable access to
EMS among the beneficiaries of the 3 schemes as shown
in Table 3. A previous survey of 3,504 ED users in public
hospitals in the 4 regions of the country revealed differ-
ent percentage of access among the beneficiaries in con-
trast to the figures. in Table 3 i.e., 10.2 % for CSMBS,
6.0 % for SSS and 68.5 % for UCS [24] Similar figures
from an earlier ED survey of 6,440 patients was also
documented [12]. The copayment also coexisted with in-
equitable health outcomes as reported in a previousle linear regression analysis (N = 41,550; 4.7 % missing value)












Table 7 Summary of telephone survey findings by the Clearing House
Topic 1 April-30 June 2012 1 April-31 July 2013 1 October-December 2013
Number of cases contacted (%inpatient) 673 (72 %) 640 (100 %) 560 (79 %)
Number of response (%) 351 (52 %) 461 (72 %) 321 (57 %)
EMS conditions
Injury (%) 62 (18 %) 39 (8 %) 87 (27 %)
non-injury (%) 289 (82 %) 422 (92 %) 234 (73 %)
severity
critical 185 (53 %) 216 (47 %) N.A.
urgent 166 (47 %) 245 (53 %) N.A.
copayment
not being requested 164 (47 %) 23 (5 %) 92 (29 %)
full payment 13 (4 %) 415 (90 %) 96 (30 %)
partial payment 79 (23 %) 23 (5 %) 133 (41 %)
% missing 27 % 0 % 0 %
Patient understanding of the definition of emergency conditions
% well understand 28 16 N.A.
N.A. not available
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dence from developed countries on the effects of copay-
ment on access to hospital ED or other forms of
healthcare, nonetheless, has been inconclusive as men-
tioned in the introduction. A recent report using
difference-in-difference analysis of data over a 10-year
period did not demonstrate a reduction in ED use fol-
lowing the enforcement of copayment in the U.S. [20]
The authors ascribe this negative finding to several fac-
tors. First, difficulty in collecting the copayment out of
fear of violating the provisions of the Emergency Med-
ical Treatment & Labor (EMTALA) Act Law, which re-
quires hospitals to provide appropriate medical
screening to persons seeking medical care through an
ED, and that hospitals treat and stabilize anyone with an
emergency medical condition. Second, ED health care
providers may have difficulty determining whether a visit
was due to a medical emergency or was non-urgent.
There has been no consensus on what constitutes a
non-urgent visit, which helps to account for the wide
variation in estimates for non-urgent ED visits (range,
8–60 % of all ED visits). Third, ED staff are required to
give the beneficiary the name of an accessible Medicaid
health care provider, which, given the national shortage
of Medicaid health care providers, may be difficult for
many EDs.
Bypassing the local gatekeepers and contracted referral
hospitals
In similar to several countries in Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) with
UHC, under the policy directive Thai patients in urgentconditions are allowed to directly seek hospital ED with-
out copayment [25]. However, the policy put emphasis
on seeking ED closest to the place of emergency events.
To the contrary, our findings documented hospitals con-
cerned about bypassing issue and used this issue to jus-
tify copayment (Table 8). Viewing from the demand side
perspective, our telephone surveys found perception of
inferior quality of care as main reason for bypassing. In
the Netherlands, Valk et al. found expectation of diag-
nostic tests not available at general practice clinics as
the main reason for patients bypassing to hospital ED
[26]. The next common reason was patient being already
under specialist care at the hospital. More or less, these
findings could be considered in the same vein as our re-
port of the patients’ perception of inferior quality of
care. Perhaps, these reasons may influence some coun-
tries (such as England and Denmark) with strong gate-
keeping mechanisms in place to introduce new
initiatives designed to facilitate access to specialists [25].
The declining percentage of patients with critical con-
ditions over the 21-month period shown in Table 4 may
reflect a demand for after-hour specialist care. Schoen
et al. reported difficulty in getting care nights, weekends,
or holidays was of significant concern among adults in
all five OECD countries (Canadian and U.S. adults espe-
cially the elderly were also more likely to have gone to
hospital ED for care that their regular source could have
provided if available [27]. This finding is in keeping with
our results shown in Table 3 that CSMBS beneficiaries
not only constituted the highest percent of ED users but
also were the oldest among all groups of beneficiaries.
Taking together the findings of OECD countries and
Table 8 Summary of key findings from in-depth interviews
Emerging themes Regulators Private hospital directors, financial staff
and ED staffs
The clearing house administrators The administrators of the health
insurance schemes
Opinions about the policy
initiatives
1. The policy maker makes reference to
the Sanatorium Act B.E. 2541 under the
MOH to recruit the private hospitals into
the policy implementation. This is
perceived to be a very rare case since
the law came into effect over a decade.
1. The policy makers give too short
notice for private hospitals to consider
whether to participate or not.
2. The single payment rate is considered
inappropriate for the cost of provision of
EMS which could substantially vary from
case to case.
3. The rationale and method used for
determining single payment rate are
considered unclear.
4. Prior to the policy initiatives, the
private hospitals claim of having been
providing EMS to any patients in an
emergency condition, even free of
charge, on ethical ground and as
required by the law. Hence the policy
requirement is considered redundant.
1. The hectic manner in policy
implementation precludes adequate
design of payment rate and timely
responses from the health insurance
schemes in terms of modification of
rules and regulations to support the
policy requirement (single payment rate
and payment mechanism).
1. The policy makers give too short
notice for the health insurance schemes
to get organize in response to the policy.
The single payment rate to private
hospitals and the clearing house
mechanism are the issues of major
concern since there is no the existing
rules and regulations to support the
scheme compliance to the policy
requirement.
2. The UCS administrator advocates for
the implemented payment rate out of a
concern of financial sustainability since
per head budget for the UCS is the
lowest among the 3 schemes.
Operational definitions for
emergency conditions
(EC) and the state of
being stabilized enough
for inter-hospital transfer.
The definition has been used to guide
prehospital care ambulance for many
years. It was developed based on the
U.S. standards.
1. The operational definition of EC is not
clear cut hence rendering abuse from
some users with non EC. There are
examples of users choose to visit a
private hospital far away from the scene
of emergency event instead of choosing
the nearby hospitals.
2. The definition for judging whether a
patient is stable for inter-hospital transfer
is not available. This induces difficulty in
transferring the patients especially CSMBS
beneficiaries to other hospitals especially
public hospitals in case the patients
could not afford the cost of further stay
beyond 72 h in the private hospitals.
The operational definition for severity
classification of EC is too subjective
especially for discriminating patients with
non-critical conditions. As a result, mis-
classification of the patients among se-
verity categories could render difficulty
in claim approval.
1. SSS beneficiaries with EC who are
admitted to hospitals outside the
contract are allowed to stay no more
than 72 h before transferring to
contracted hospitals. Hence the lack of
definition on patients being stabilized for
inter-hospital transfer is less likely to
affect SSS beneficiaries. Similar arrange-
ment like this does not exist in the
health insurance system under CSMBS
and UCS. However, the UCS beneficiaries
are less likely than those of CSMBS to
face difficulty in the inter-hospital transfer
issue since the formers are registered to
certain hospitals whereas the latters are




and acceptance of the
definition among the key
stakeholders
1. Formal meetings were held among all
relevant stakeholders to inform detailed
definition and its implications for service
provision.
1. Sensible approach to the adoption of
such definition should be based on
consultation of providers and
professional organizations such as the
Royal College of Surgery etc.
1. Apart from a formal meeting to inform
providers and the health insurance
schemes about the definition, a public
telephone number was set up to
facilitate clarification of relevant concerns
of stakeholders since day one of the
implementation.
2. Formal training sessions were
organized to assist application of the
definition by the private hospitals.
1.A formal meeting was held among the
administrators of the health insurance






1. Until the present, there has not been
any formal mechanisms to keep track on
the compliance of private hospitals to
the Sanatorium Act.
Not applicable 1. Financial audit of claimed data on case
by case basis is mandatory for
compensation to the private hospitals.
2. Time limit has been imposed on the















Table 8 Summary of key findings from in-depth interviews (Continued)
2. So far based on my experience (a
senior health officer) in working in the
Health Facility Committee under the
Sanatorium Act, there has not been a
single case of specific private hospitals
being seriously dealt with for
misconduct.
avoid unnecessary delay of the
compensation to the hospitals.




1. There has not been any concrete
information systems to keep track of
service provision in private hospitals
except for setting up online channel for
user complaints.
1. Some security-market registered hospi-
tals describe network of member hospi-
tals with certain degree of differentiated
specialization to support patients with
specific needs and different level of pur-
chasing power. The network, hence, is in
a better position to smoothly handle
continuity of care including inter-hospital
transfer of patients with diverse needs
and purchasing power. In addition, these
hospitals also contend that maintaining
standby teams of medical specialties for
any major emergency cases is costly
hence justifying the price setting.
2. A few security-market registered pri-
vate hospitals show concrete evidence of
standard protocols for certain EC like
acute abdomen, acute chest pain.
3. It is the duty of a physician in charge
of specific patients in EC to do severity
classification. Charge processing is the
responsibility of financial staffs taking into
account the standard claim protocol of
the clearing house.
1. A standard online claim protocol is
specifically established for the program.
According to the protocol, expected
timeline for claim processing is set to be
completed within a month from the
date of claim submission.
2. Only financial audit is conducted to
ensure hospital compliance to the
protocol.
3. There is no pre-admission
authorization for each hospitalized
patient.
Not applicable
Feedback on the payment
and the regulation
Volume of prehospital ambulance
services by the national lead agency of
emergency care system is reported to
the high-level decision-making forum on
monthly basis.
1. Without acceptable financial
compensation to private hospitals,
compliance to the law is hardly
achievable.
2. The private hospitals proposed revision
of the single payment rate to reflect the
cost of service provision through
participatory approach.
3. Private hospitals set prices to reflect
full cost recovery and a
surplus of under 15 % per annum
4. Given the fact that a number of
patients bypass the hospitals closest to
the place of events, it is justified to
impose copayment to mitigate this
misconduct on the demand side.
Monthly feedback to the high-level
decision-making forum involves trends of
: volume of service, access by health in-
surance status, number of patients by se-
verity classification, type of hospital visits,
findings from periodic telephone surveys,
number of participating hospitals, dur-
ation of arrangement for inter-hospital
transfer of inpatient, copayment
1. It is not clear about the progress on
the attempts to make changes in rules
and regulations for payment mechanism
relevant to the program expectation.
2. CSMBS and SSS administrators concern
about potential impacts of the expected
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healthcare systems are responding to patients’ needs.
And in response to after-hour healthcare needs, those
OECD countries came up with different initiatives such
as after-hours general practitioner clinics co-located with
ED in Australia, a Primary Health Care Transition Fund
to encourage models of round-the-clock, team-based
care in Canada, and twenty-four-hour nurse-staffed hot-
line and NHS Walk-In Centres in the United Kingdom
[27]. Similarly, many public hospitals in Thailand cur-
rently provide after-hour clinics from 5 to 8 pm on
weekdays and 9–12 am on Saturday. Nonetheless, there
has not been any systematic assessment as to the im-
pacts of these after-hour clinics in meeting the demand
using ED as an indicator.
Strategies for dealing with copayment
These difficulties confronting the U.S. hospitals (mainly
private) are, in turn, instructive to improvement of the
provisions and enforcement of the Sanatorium Act in
Thailand. First the Sanatorium Act should include provi-
sions with more specific details requiring hospitals to
provide screening, stabilizing and transfer for the pa-
tients similar to those of EMTALA. Provisions for pen-
alty should also be clear and substantial enough like that
of EMTALA. Apart from the provisions; the effective-
ness of enforcing EMTALA lies on the so-called “Medi-
care death penalty” i.e. termination of Medicare contract
to hospitals based on result of investigation of potential
law violations by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) [28]. The death penalty is meaningful to
the United States hospitals because of arguably substantial
financial contribution from CMS to the hospitals. This is
not quite the case in Thai context in which major revenues
for many private hospitals come from private insurance
and OOP. In addition, with diverse payment rates and
methods among the 3 schemes functioning independently,
it is difficult to impose meaningful financial sanctions to
the private hospitals. In this regard, harmonization of pay-
ment methods and rates of the 3 schemes should take into
account strengthening the bargaining power of public
healthcare financing against the private hospitals. Finally,
enforcement of the Sanatorium Act would need to put in
place an investigative mechanism like that of CMS. This in-
volves impartial status of the investigators and sufficient fi-
nancial support for the investigation.
Concerning well-informed decision of the users, the
findings on limited knowledge of the users indicate inad-
equate policy communication based mainly on mass
media and out-door media. This could be addressed
through regulatory measure mandating the hospitals to
make formal notification of the right of access to every
patient visiting ED as is the case under EMTALA. In
many European countries, hospitals are required to bearthe burden of proof in case of liability for malpractice
and errors in providing information [29]. This kind of
legal provision could enhance the sensitivity of the hos-
pitals to users’ need for relevant information.
Review of national efforts among BRICS countries
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) reveals
substantial contribution of private providers in health-
care provision [30]. In fact, this situation is not unique
to BRICS countries but is similar to those in many other
low-middle income countries including Thailand. This
undeniable role of the private sector poses a specific
challenge in the public sector i.e., stewarding mixed pri-
vate and public health systems. Our report suggests
intermingled role of stewardship (the role of regulator)
and financing (the role of the three major schemes) in
promoting more access to EMS in Thailand - a country
with over a decade of experience in sustaining UHC. Al-
though we are able to shed light on provision of EMS
among a selected group of private hospitals not previ-
ously included in the purchasing models of the three
schemes, regrettably so far there has not been any evi-
dence on the provision of EMS by contracted private
hospitals under SSS and UCS. This indicates room for
improvement of relevant information systems to keep
track of the service provision.
Needs for further studies
Considering a need for strategic purchasing from power-
ful private sector in pursuit of UHC, the present report
indicates a number of inter-related key specific issues for
further studies: capacity building for healthcare financing
agencies in negotiating with private providers based on
rational and evidence-based price setting; and design of
technically strong and high commitment of regulatory
mechanism to set up effective legal framework to ensure
sufficient access and fair pricing. Both these issues
should be conceived along with the development of suf-
ficient information systems to keep track of private pro-
viders in terms of service provision (access and quality)
and pricing. Finally, further studies should focus on as-
sessment of implementation of the suggested legal mea-
sures to enhance providers’ sensitivity to users’ need for
relevant information at the point of care. Finally, system-
atic assessment on the impacts of the provision of after-
hour clinics by public hospitals should be conducted
taking account ED as an indicator.
Limitations
We chose to focus on inpatient dataset hence rendering
inadequate exploration of ED visits. The results of user
survey could be biased due to substantial number of
non-respondents or failure to make contact. We could
not explore methodological details of the telephone sur-
vey of the Clearing House, which might be subject to
Suriyawongpaisal et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2016) 16:606 Page 17 of 18selection bias and information bias. Without access to
minutes of the executive meetings during the policy im-
plementation, we were not able to explore interactions
among policymakers and the key stakeholders. In-depth
interviews were conducted during the first few months
of the program, hence the findings may not be up-to-
date given the dynamicity of the policy context resulting
in changing faces of policymakers during the 21-month
period. Finally, administration of the EMCO dataset is
not sophisticated enough, hence quite substantial rele-
vant data are missing for some variables. This deficit in
data quality might affect parameter estimation.
Conclusion
Using a mixed-methods approach to draw evidence from
multiple sources, we have been able to shed light on the
existence of copayment in the Thai healthcare system des-
pite the presence of UHC since 2001. The copayment
poses a barrier of access to emergency care delivered by
private hospitals according to the policy proclaiming free
access. The copayment differentially affects different bene-
ficiaries of the major 3 public-health insurance schemes
hence inducing inequity of access. We have identified 6
drivers of the copayment i.e., perceived under payment,
unclear operational definitions of emergency conditions or
lack of criteria to justify inter-hospital transfer after the
first 72 h of admission, limited understanding by the ser-
vice users of the policy-directed benefits, weak regulatory
mechanism as indicated by lack of information systems to
trace private provider’s practices, and ineffective arrange-
ments for inter-hospital transfer. With demand-side per-
spectives, we addressed the reasons for bypassing
gatekeepers or assigned local hospitals. These are the per-
ception of inferior quality of care and age-related tendency
to use ED, which indicate a deficit in the current health-
care systems under UHC. Finally, we have discussed strat-
egies to address these potential drivers of copayment and
needs for further studies.
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